Ephemeral PhoneOpen console

Security and trust

Know what moves—and what still knows.

Remote Android changes where application data and identity live. It does not erase the metadata, provider trust, or endpoint risks around them.

Designed protections

  • Android application data lives on the runtime host rather than the thin client.
  • The hosted browser never receives the Hugging Face or backend administrator credential.
  • GitHub identity maps to an owner-specific backend credential.
  • Stream access uses short-lived tickets, and the gateway proxies only an explicit operation allowlist.
  • Audit events record lifecycle operations.

Trust boundaries

You still trust the runtime host, its operator, storage, hypervisor or container boundary, network path, identity provider, web deployment, browser, and any third-party infrastructure in the chosen deployment. A compromised runtime host can access the Android guest. A compromised client can observe the session while authorised.

The hosted reference also depends on GitHub, Vercel, Hugging Face, the owner's tunnel, and the laptop running Cuttlefish.

Current limitations

Ephemeral Phone is not an anonymity network, certified secure handset, forensic countermeasure, or guarantee against account compromise, traffic analysis, malicious apps, screenshots, browser history, or a hostile infrastructure operator.

The mock provider is a UI and lifecycle test double; it provides no Android isolation. Privacy zones are browser-enforced and stop when the page closes. A phone marked locked may still depend on the runtime provider to enforce that state correctly.

Report a vulnerability

Do not post exploit details in a public issue. Use the public repository’s private security-advisory workflow so maintainers can review the report without disclosing it. A dedicated disclosure mailbox and published response targets remain release work.